Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2011

Constitutional Hypocrisy
Girardeau A. Spann
Georgetown University Law Center, spann@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1928

27 Const. Comment. 557 (2010-2011)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

CONSTITUTIONAL HYPOCRISY*
GirardeauA. Spann **
INTRODUCTION
My legal realist inclinations leave me largely agnostic about
the particular provisions that happen to be included in any
particular constitution. That is because both written and
unwritten constitutions seem more likely to reflect than to
prescribe the normative values of the cultures that adopt them.
As a result, the substantive, structural, and procedural provisions
of the present United States Constitution seem perfectly
adequate to promote justice-at least in a culture that is
genuinely committed to the cause of justice. No constitution is
likely to promote justice in a culture that lacks such a
commitment. Nevertheless, there is one change that I would
make if I were rewriting our current Constitution. I would
eliminate the institution of judicial review.
Judicial review is commonly thought to facilitate an
acceptable degree of convergence between the abstract
principles celebrated in our written Constitution and the actual
practices of our political culture in the conduct of its day-to-day
affairs. However, I fear that judicial review, in fact, serves
precisely the opposite function. For example, the United States
Constitution rests heavily on the abstract principle of equality.
The equality principle, which seems to be a staple of most
mature legal cultures, incorporates an a priori normative belief
that justice requires like things to be treated alike. But the
political culture often prefers to allocate benefits and burdens in
ways that violate the equality principle, by according differential
treatment to individuals and groups based on characteristics such
as race, gender, wealth, social class, sexuality, political affiliation,
* Copyright © 2011 by Girardeau A. Spann.
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religious conviction, and the like. I suspect that the culture's
commitment to abstract equality is as genuine as the culture's
inability to resist the lure of self-interested favoritism. As a
result, the hypocrisy entailed in proclaiming equality while
practicing discrimination can be expected to generate a level of
cognitive dissonance that, if left unchecked, would be
destabilizing.
Contrary to what one might initially suspect, in this context,
destabilization would be a good thing. It would exert pressure on
the culture to cease its discriminatory behavior, or at least to abandon its claim of fidelity to the equality principle. But the
perceived conflict between principle and practice will not have
this salutary effect if the dissonance between the two can
somehow be dissipated. My fear is that the institution of judicial
review serves this dissonance-reduction function well enough to
preserve and protect the hypocrisy of the political culture. The
culture, of course, has other dissonance-reduction techniques at
its disposal. But the hypocrisy function of judicial review is
particularly offensive, because it utilizes self-deception to make
the practice of oppression actually appear to be noble. Because
it is difficult to identify any truly benign function that judicial
review has served in United States culture, I would rewrite the
Constitution to make the institution of judicial review itself
unconstitutional. There are, of course, practical problems
entailed in "rewriting" a Constitution to eliminate a provision
that never actually appears in the Constitution, and in describing
the precise forms of "judicial review" that I would preclude. But,
as will become apparent, there is no need to resolve those
practical details at the present time.1
I. REALISM
The legal realists have taught us that doctrine does not
determine outcomes. Moreover, the postmodern extension of
realist thought into the general realm of rational epistemology
now engenders skepticism about all causal accounts that purport
to transcend the normative perspectives of those who offer them.
Because the United States Constitution is a repository of
doctrinal assertions, resting on the particular set of
epistemological conventions that we utilize to give the document
1. For an argument establishing the practical viability of abolishing judicial review
with respect to acts of Congress see Mark Tushnet, Abolishing Judicial Review, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 581 (2011). My argument is more ethereal.
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meaning, it would be unrealistic to expect the Constitution to do
anything more than reflect the normative values of our political
culture at particular points in its evolution. By "our culture" or
"our political culture" I mean that idealized collection of "us"
who believe in abstractions that are commonly thought to
constitute the American way of life-e.g., universal unalienable
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-but who also
tolerate deviations in practice from the abstract norms that we
espouse-e.g.,
poverty, parochialism, and
xenophobic
intolerance. The Constitution cannot constrain our actions, or
our beliefs, in a way that causes us to become someone other
than who we are.
A. CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism entails the belief that legitimate
governmental power is limited by fundamental principles
contained in a source of higher law that supersedes policies
adopted through the ordinary political process. In United States
culture, that higher law is articulated in a written Constitution,
whose provisions are ultimately enforced through the institution
of judicial review. Marbury v. Madison,2 therefore, recognized a
countermajoritarian power in the politically insulated Supreme
Court to invalidate representative branch actions that violate the
fundamental principles contained in the Constitution. That is the
way that constitutionalism and judicial review are supposed to
work? But there are alternate accounts.
Legal realism has taught us that legal doctrine -including the
doctrine embedded in the Constitution-is alone too indeterminate to resolve disputes. Whether focusing on constitutional
text, original intent, or one's favored theory of constitutional
interpretation, there is always adequate play in the doctrine to
support divergent outcomes. As a result, constitutional meaning is
inevitably vulnerable to the normative values and political
preferences of those doing the interpreting -including Justices
sitting on the Supreme Court.! It is, therefore, difficult to
imagine a Supreme Court interpreting vague insistences on "due
process" and "equal protection-or even absolute prohibitions
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See, e.g., Constitutionalism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Constitutionalism (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Judicial Review, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_review (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
4. See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical
Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669,1670-76 (1982).
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on "abridging the freedom of speech" or "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts" -without being influenced by the
values and preferences of the Justices themselves.' If that were
not the case, Supreme Court confirmation hearings would focus
on a nominee's analytical abilities rather than on a nominee's
position concerning controversial political issues, and Senators
would not vote so closely along party lines.
The legal realists sought to counteract the indeterminacy of
doctrine by pairing law with foundational principles rooted in
procedural regularity, or in their own preferred social sciences.
However, the critical legal studies movement then applied realist
indeterminacy insights to the foundational principles of the
realists themselves, in order to demonstrate that those principles
were no more determinate than the legal doctrines they had
been offered to bolster.' As described by Robin West, the critical
legal studies movement emphasized that doctrinal interpretations
tended to skew outcomes in favor of existing power relationships
by reinforcing the view that those outcomes were not only neutral
and necessary, but were properly divorced from extra-legal moral
or political concerns. Utilizing the analytical technique of
deconstruction to expose the illusion of "false necessity" on
which doctrinal outcomes typically rested, the critical legal
studies movement sought to neutralize the often oppressive
power of "liberal legalism" to perpetuate the status quo. As a
normative matter, therefore, the critical legal studies movement
tended to favor progressive policies and politics. But as critical
legal studies matured into a full-blown postmodern
epistemological movement, the normative predispositions of
critical legal studies themselves came to be recognized as yet
another set of contingent and socially constructed principles. So
understood, postmodernism, carried indeterminacy to its logical
extreme by, ironically, questioning the coherence of the logical
rationality that is typically offered to justify the application of
judicial power. Let me emphasize, it is not that there is no
difference between right and wrong. It is only that doctrine and
syllogistic analysis cannot reliably illuminate the distinction
between the two.

5. See, U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process); id. amend XIV, § 1 (due process &
equal protection); id. amend. I (free speech); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (obligation of contracts).
6. See Note, supra note 4, at 1676-86 (1982).
7. See ROBIN WEST, Critical Legal Studies- The Missing Years, in NORMATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION Ch. 3 (2011).
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B. TRICAMERALISM
Judges are not necessarily misbehaving when they consult
extra-legal values and preferences in giving meaning to
constitutional provisions. They have no other option. Abstract
constitutional principles cannot acquire operative meaning in a
way that is independent from the perspectives and experiences
of the judges who interpret those principles. But it would be a
mistake to think that something more than judicial construction
is what is going on. Ultimately, it is the Justices on the Supreme
Court-and not the provisions of the Constitution-that are
resolving the constitutional disputes brought before the Court.
That should cause us to have more realist expectations about the
nature of constitutionalism. The Supreme Court is better understood as yet another policymaking branch of a tricameral
legislature than as a reliable guardian of constitutional
principles. As such, the Court is more likely to reflect than to
prescribe the normative values of our culture.
Although it is now common for us to accord the Supreme
Court final say over controversial social policy issues such as
abortion, school prayer and affirmative action, this judicial
policymaking was not within the original conception of judicial
review. Bill Treanor has emphasized that, prior to Marbury,
judicial review was viewed as a natural outgrowth of the popular
sovereignty expressed in our written Constitution-but not as a
substitute for popular sovereignty. Accordingly, state and federal courts invalidated statutes raising structural or process
problems. They did so where legislation affected coordinate
branch institutions such as juries or courts that were not part of
the political process producing the statutes, or where a state
statute infringed on a sphere of power reserved for the federal
government. However, where such structural concerns were
absent, courts generally deferred to the political judgments of
state and federal legislatures.' In Marbury itself, Chief Justice
Marshall disclaimed jurisdiction over questions that are "in their
nature political."9
History and the Marbury admonition notwithstanding,
contemporary judicial review now often entails the substitution
of Supreme Court policy preferences for the legislative and

8.
UNITED
Treanor,
9.

See WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE

STATES, 1780-1803, at 1-7 (2010) (unpublished manuscript); William Michael
JudicialReview before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457-60 (2005).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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executive policy preferences that the Court invalidates in the
exercise of judicial review. Such countermajoritarian judicial
policymaking cannot be justified in the name of
constitutionalism, because realist insights make it difficult to
maintain that the Court's decisions emanate from the
Constitution rather than from the discretion of the Justices
themselves. Depending on the sympathies of the Justices, the
Constitution could be read to require socialism,'0 or to support
the laissez-faire ideology of the Tea Party movement.'
Accordingly, some commentators have argued for a more
limited judicial role, advocating judicial minimalism in the
exercise of judicial review as a means of facilitating democratic
policymaking. 12 And in the proposed Judiciary Act of 2009reminiscent of the New Deal Court packing plan-highly
regarded constitutional scholars across the political spectrum
control over the Supreme Court by the
have favored heightened
3
political branches.
Because there is no way to insulate judicial review from
judicial policy preferences, the Supreme Court is better
understood as a policymaking branch of government than as a
branch that operates above politics. It is as if the Court were the
third house of a tricameral legislature in which each house represents different constituencies. 4 Mark Tushnet has described how
terms of office affect political responsiveness. The House of
Representatives is directly elected to represent local
constituencies, and its two-year term of office makes it
responsive to relatively immediate political trends. The
10.

See Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980) (reviewing

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).

11. See Matthew Continetti, The Two Faces Of The Tea Party: Rick Santelli, Glenn
Beck, And The Future Of The Populist Insurgency, WEEKLY STANDARD, June 28, 2010,
at 18, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/two-faces-tea-party.
12. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS

(2010). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (2008) (Harvard Univ.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 08-40) (suggesting that "the justifications
for judicial minimalism are unconvincing in many contexts"), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1274200
9, 2009)
13. See Four Proposals For A Judiciary Act (February
(http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%2Judiciary%20Act.htm).
14. Cf. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 191-92 (2000)

(suggesting that Supreme Court acts like a political policymaking body); ALEC STONE,
THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3-19, 209-21 (1992) (arguing that
Constitutional Council operates in ways similar to a legislative chamber).

the
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President is elected indirectly by state electors in the Electoral
College to represent the interests of the national majority,
serving a four-year term that makes the President somewhat less
responsive to immediate political trends. The Senate was initially
elected indirectly by state legislatures to represent state
constituencies. Although it is now directly elected, the Senate's
six-year term of office makes it even less responsive to
immediate political trends, but more responsive to durable
political coalitions. The Supreme Court is "elected" indirectly,
through Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Life
tenure gives Supreme Court justices even longer "terms of
office," with the actual tenure of a Supreme Court justice since
1970 averaging 26.1 years. 5 This not only insulates the Court
from immediate political trends, but makes it sufficiently
resistant to social change that the Court ends up representing
those political constituencies who favor maintaining the status
quo.16 The Supreme Court can, therefore, be viewed either as the
third branch of a policymaking legislature (consisting of the
House, the Senate and the Court), or as the third branch of a
policymaking federal government (consisting of Congress, the
President and the Court).
Once the Supreme Court is viewed as a legislative-type
policymaking body, it becomes unrealistic to expect the Court to
expound constitutional meaning in a detached or disinterested
manner. Because the Court is endogenous in the legislative
policymaking process, it does not make sense to view Supreme
Court adjudication as an exogenous check on legislative
policymaking excesses. However, because judicial review gives
the Court veto power at the final stage of the policymaking
process, it does make sense to view Supreme Court adjudication
as reflecting the evolving normative values of the culture at the
time the adjudication occurs. It is as if the Court were utilizing
constitutional exposition to certify cultural acceptance of policies
15. See Mark Tushnet, The Politics Of Constitutional Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 223-26 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982) (discussing the
political responsiveness of various branches); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court. Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 769, 770-71 (2006) (discussing the average Supreme Court tenure). The
average tenure from 1789-1971 was 14.9 years. See id.
16. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 99-103 (1993).
Although one might argue that the Supreme Court sometimes upsets rather than protects
the status quo, such progressive victories can often be viewed as simply reflecting
contemporary majoritarian political preferences. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
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that reflect the lowest common denominator among the various
political constituencies represented by the three branches of our
tricameral policymaking government. If the Constitution means
only what the Supreme Court says it means-and the Supreme
Court ends up reflecting rather than prescribing the normative
values that are shared by the prevailing political culture-it
probably does not much matter what particular provisions the
Constitution happens to contain. Nevertheless, I would rewrite
the Constitution to preclude judicial review as needlessly
pernicious.
II. DISSONANCE
The reason that judicial review is pernicious is that it often
facilitates hypocrisy. This can be illustrated by considering the
manner in which the political culture has implemented the
equality principle that permeates the Constitution. Although the
culture's rhetorical commitment to the principle of abstract
equality is demonstrably strong, the culture's operational commitment to the practice of actual equality is noticeably weak.
The ensuing divergence between principle and practice can
generate a degree of cultural dissonance that would be
destabilizing if it were not somehow reduced. I do not intend to
suggest that such dissonance is limited to the equality principle
alone. In fact, I think dissonance can be generated in the
implementation of any principle. But the dissonance attendant
to the equality principle is usefully illustrative precisely because
it is so foundational.
A. EQUALITY

The equality principle-which embodies the a priori belief
that like things should be treated alike-seems to be ubiquitous
in contemporary legal cultures. 7 In United States culture, the
equality principle has even been viewed as flowing from natural
law." There can, of course, be difficulties in deciding when things
17. See, e.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A,
U.N. Doc AJ810 at 71, pmbl., arts 1, 2, 7, 10, 16, 21, 23 & 26 (1948) ; RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977); VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 197-99 (2010); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 237-38 (1971); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
537, 543 n.20, 547 n.33 (1982).
18. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776); Abraham
Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, reprinted
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1946);
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN'T
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are alike or different (e.g. determining whether particular gender
differences are real or socially constructed). The equality
principle can also conflict with a legal culture's commitment to
other principles, such as the principle that protects individual
liberty (e.g. determining whether prohibitions on racial
discrimination are compelled by the equality principle, or precluded by the liberty principle's protection of associational
freedom). Some liberal theorists, such as John Rawls, believe
that the right to equal liberty has lexical priority over the right to
equality in the distribution of economic and social resources.19
Others, such as Ronald Dworkin, believe that equality is a
necessary component of any liberty worth protecting. 2 Because
the equality principle transcends legal cultures, theorists such as
Vicki Jackson believe that comparative constitutional engagement can illuminate the range of approaches available to
mediate the tensions that often exist between the equality and
liberty principles, and within the equality principle itself. 1 Regardless of how one might resolve any potential conflict between
liberty and equality, it seems plain that the equality principle is
fundamental.
The emphasis that liberal theorists place on equality seems
to be replicated in constitutional doctrine. Since 1868, the
Fourteenth Amendment has contained an express Equal
Protection Clause, but even the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause adopted in 1791 constitutionalized an unwritten equality
principle.22 What might be less apparent is that many of the other
substantive guarantees of the Constitution also rest on a
requirement of government neutrality-a requirement that itself
embodies a commitment to equal treatment, and that seems
perfectly appropriate given the foundational role that the
equality principle plays in our culture. For example, the so-called
constitutional right to vote has been treated as more of a
safeguard against discriminatory abridgment than as an
unqualified grant of the franchise.
WAIT 80 (1964), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArticiesGen/Letter_
Birmingham.html (1963).
19. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 42-43, 60-65, 150-56, 243-51.
20. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 266-78.
21. See JACKSON, supra note 17 at 197-226.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id. amend. V; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954) (finding an unwritten equality principle in the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause).
23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XV; Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election Bd., 553
U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 977
U.S. 533,554-56 (1964).
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Although the First Amendment free speech guarantee is
written in absolute terms, it has been interpreted to permit
considerable government regulation of speech and expressive
activity. But in the absence of a showing that would satisfy strict
scrutiny, the government must remain neutral with respect to the
content or viewpoint of the speech that it is regulating. That
means that, as a regulator, the government cannot constitutionally discriminate in favor of speech that it likes or against
speech that it dislikes.24 Similar neutrality requirements prohibit
government discrimination in regulating symbolic speech 25 or
access to the public forum.26 The First Amendment religion
clauses preclude the government from establishing religion and
from prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 27 But once again, the
absolute language of the religion clauses has been read primarily
to prohibit discriminatory departures from neutrality with
respect to religion or religious denominations.2
The term "substantive due process" may be a literal
oxymoron, but it is now firmly established in our constitutional
jurisprudence. Substantive due process rights are rarely
unqualified, but rather, are rights against which the Constitution
tends to prohibit discrimination. Accordingly, the unenumerated
substantive due process right to privacy does not guarantee a
right to abortion, but rather requires only a semblance of
government neutrality. The government, therefore, cannot
punish someone for having an abortion. But it also need not
fund someone's abortion, even if it funds other pregnancyrelated health care including childbirth. All it need do is remain
neutral with respect to an individual's own abortion preferences.29 There also appears to be a substantive due process
right to reject life-saving medical treatment 0 but not a right to
assisted suicide.3 ' By invoking the distinction between acts and
24. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-90 (1992).
25. E.g., Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07, 414-20 (1989).
26. E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1983).
27. U.S. CONST. amend I.
28. E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (requiring State
neutrality under the Establishment Clause); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-82 (1990) (requiring State neutrality under the Free
Exercise Clause).
29. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 471-74 (1977).
30. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.")
31. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-26 (1997).
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omissions, the government is viewed as neutrally declining to
penalize or subsidize individual end-of-life choices.
The substantive due process right to sexual privacy prohibits
the government from penalizing same-sex intimate conduct,32
although it does not presently require the government to
subsidize same sex marriage with formal recognition.33 Similarly,
there is a substantive due process right to travel whose exercise
the government may not penalize, 34 but the neutrality required
by the equality principle does not require the government to
subsidize the right by purchasing the traveler's bus ticket.35 A
recently revived view of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause now contains a comparable prohibition
on discrimination between old and new residents with respect to
the distribution of government benefits," and the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause contains an express
prohibition on discrimination based on state citizenship.37
The state action requirement that serves as the gatekeeper
for Fourteenth Amendment safeguards is notoriously elusive,
because state action can be detected beneath any form of public
or private action if one is inclined to look for it. As a result, the
most coherent efforts to prescribe meaning for the state action
requirement entail a determination of whether the government
has remained neutral while engaging in the background state
action that is at issue. 8 Accordingly, granting a liquor license to a
racially discriminatory private club does not constitute state
action when done as part of a neutral administrative scheme,39

but enforcing a racially restrictive real property covenant does
constitute state action when done as part of a pattern of
historical discrimination.4" Even the protection of fundamental
liberties themselves that are guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as the right to procreate, sometimes takes the form of
prohibitions on discrimination. The Supreme Court has never
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
34. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-38 (1969) (finding a right to travel).
35. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977) ("Shapiro ... did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the
indigent travelers.").
36. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-07 (1999).
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
38. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 229-31,

238-41, 245-48 (4th ed. 2009).
39. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,171-79 (1972).
40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948).
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reversed its decision permitting the involuntary sterilization of
people who are mentally retarded,4' but it has invalidated the use
41
of such sterilization in a discriminatory manner.
There is little doubt that the culture honors the abstract
principle of equality. Equality is a widely shared moral precept,
and it pervades many areas of contemporary constitutional law.
Indeed, most of the interesting provisions in the Constitution
ultimately boil down to mere guarantees of equal treatment.
However, it is also clear that the culture fails to honor the
abstract principle of equality in practice. This, of course, leaves
the culture vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy.
B. HYPOCRISY

Although United States culture is rhetorically committed to
the principle that like things should be treated alike, in actual
practice, the culture commonly discriminates against individuals
and groups on the basis of characteristics that would seem to be
illegitimate. Discrimination is illegitimate under the equality
principle when it is based on characteristics that are irrelevant,
or only marginally relevant, to the instrumental objectives for
which a classification is being invoked. Unfortunately, much of
the culture's discriminatory behavior falls into this category. It is
readily apparent that the culture discriminates in the allocation
of benefits and burdens on the basis of characteristics such as
race, gender, wealth, social class, sexuality, political affiliation,
and religious conviction. But those characteristics are rarely
relevant to the culture's stated instrumental objectives. Rather,
such discrimination is often based on inaccurate cultural
stereotypes-or worse, is practiced in tacit defiance of the
equality principle itself. And professing adherence to the
equality principle while practicing invidious discrimination is, by
definition, hypocritical.
As a statistical matter, it is no secret that white males in the
United States tend to do better than racial minorities or women.
Minorities are dramatically worse off than whites with respect to
income, wealth, poverty, housing, employment, the criminal
justice system, healthcare, and access to consumer goods.43

Although women have made significant educational advances
41. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207-08 (1927).
42. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,537-43 (1942).
43. See, e.g., Mario Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?,98 GEO. L.J. 967,
982-92 (2010); Girardeau A. Spann, DisparateImpact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1151 (2010).
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and now comprise half of the US workforce, women still remain
worse off than men with respect to pay, promotions, job category
tracking, education in high-paying disciplines, work schedule
flexibility, homemaking and caregiving responsibilities, corporate
leadership positions, and political leadership positions." Women
are also disproportionatelx the victims of sexual violence,"
especially minority women. But the statistics are largely beside
the point.
Everyone who lives in the culture understands that we
discriminate against those whom we view as different from
ourselves. Recognizing this, a group of white college students in
an informal study concluded that it would take $1 million per
year in damages to compensate them if they were suddenly
transformed from being white to being black." And I suspect
that few males think that their economic, social or political
fortunes would be improved by sex change operations that
permitted them to become female. In addition, the culture's
tolerance for people with nontraditional sexual orientations has
always been greatly outweighed by its intolerance, and we
overwhelmingly continue to prohibit same-sex marriage. Being
poor is not a crime, nor is being a member of a disadvantaged
socio-economic group. But those of us who do not share those
characteristics rarely live near, or spend much time with, those of
us who do. As bad as the economic inequalities occasioned by
race and poverty may be, they are in fact understated and
exacerbated by incarceration inequalities that are also based on
race and poverty.' Many of us are anxious to fight the perils of
unlawful immigration with overbroad profiling techniques, even
though those techniques will disproportionately require
detention and identification papers for citizens and lawful aliens
who do not appear to be of European descent.49 The culture at
44. See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, Still Earning Less, CHRONICLE. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 13, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Still-Earning-Less/63482/; see generally Maria
Shriver, The Shriver Report (Heather Boushley & Ann O'Leary, eds. 2009) http://
www.shriverreport.com/awn/shriverReport.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135,137-45 (2000).
46. See, e.g., Meghan Condon, Bruise of a Different Color: The Possibilitiesof Restorative
Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
487, 489-95 (2010).
47. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK & WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 32 (1992).
48. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 85-107

(2006).
49. See Jerry Markon & Stephanie McCrummen, Judge Blocks Some Sections of
Arizona Law, WASH. POST, July 29, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
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large is reasonably tolerant of the mainstream Republicans and
Democrats among us. But if one wishes to denounce a politician
with whom one disagrees, a sensible strategy may be to label the
politician a socialist and to remind people that Hitler and Lenin
were socialists too.' Since the recent economic recession began
in 2007, the culture has become preoccupied with unemployment, even though overall unemployment rates are simply
approaching the pre-recession unemployment rates that have
typically been suffered by racial minorities.' And of course, if
you want to build a religious cultural center near the site of the
World Trade Center, it is probably best to ensure that your
religion is Judeo-Christian rather than Islamic. 2
Despite our emphatic cultural commitment to the equality
principle, our cultural commitment to the practice of invidious
discrimination appears to be equally strong. The duplicity
entailed in this divergence between principle and practice
triggers our cultural aversion to hypocrisy. Indeed, our aversion
to hypocrisy, and the reliance that it upsets, is so strong that it
underlies the very concept of estoppel-a concept that has been
a part of our common law jurisprudence for centuries. For
example, it is this distaste for hypocrisy that causes us to react
with such anger and disappointment when we learn that officials
who publicly endorse conventional propriety and family values
have hypocritically engaged in illicit sexual improprieties. 3 And
most of us failed to react well when we saw wealthy free-market
bankers hypocritically ask for multibillion dollar government
bailouts after their lending practices caused a financial collapse.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/0728/AR2010072801794.html.
50. See Dana Milbank, Wrong and Reich in Mason City, WASH. POST., July 18,
2010, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/07/16/AR2010071602855.html.
51. See Kai Filion, Downcast Unemployment Forecast: Targeted Job Creation
Policies Necessary to Offset Grim 2010 Projections, EPI ISSUE BRIEF #270, Jan 14, 2010
(http://epi.3cdn.net/d9904b716d3cf62538_psm6bnec9.pdf).
52. See Javier Hernandez, Planned Sign of Tolerance Bringing Division Instead,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/14/nyregion/14center.html; see also Liz Goodwin, Anti-mosque Protests on the
Rise, Say Muslim Advocates, YAHOO NEWS, July 21, 2010 (http://news.yahoo.com/
s/yblog..upshot/20100721/pl-yblog-upshot/anti-mosque-protests-on-the-rise-say-muslimadvocates).
53. See Ken Rudin, Sanford the Latest in a Series of Political Sex Scandals, NPR
POLITICAL JUNKIE,
June
24, 2009
(http://www.npr.org/blogs/politicaljunkie/
2009l06/sanfordjust-the-latest_sex-sc.html) (discussing hypocritical sexual behavior of
officials including Mark Sanford, John Ensign, John Edwards, Kwame Kilpatrick, Eliot
Spitzer, Larry Craig, David Vitter, Mark Foley, and Jim McGreevey).
54. See generally EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 73-127 (2d ed. 2010) (describing
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More to the point, I have an even stronger adverse reaction
whenever I hear Senators and Supreme Court nominees
hypocritically insist that Supreme Court justices should apply the
law rather than make the law-as if they honestly believed that
there was a meaningful distinction between the two activities.55
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when individuals
experience high levels of hypocritical dissonance between their
behavior and their beliefs, they will feel strong psychological
pressure to reduce that dissonance.56 If we assume heuristically
that cognitive dissonance theory works the same way on the
cultural level as it does on the individual psychological level-or
if we assume that cultures can only act through individual agents
who themselves respond to psychological pressures -cognitive
dissonance theory can help to explain why judicial review is
potentially pernicious. We do not like to think of ourselves as
hypocrites. And judicial review is a cultural device that we can
use to dissipate the dissonance that we would otherwise
experience if forced to confront our own constitutional
hypocrisy.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review reduces cognitive dissonance by convincing
the culture that its discriminatory behavior is consistent with-or
even compelled by-the equality principle. While exploiting the
inevitable indeterminacy of constitutional doctrine, the Supreme
Court can rationalize our hypocrisy by turning it into
praiseworthy constitutional behavior. Although judicial review is
not the only dissonance-reduction technique that is available to
the culture, it is perhaps the most offensive. By sanctifying
deviations from the equality principle, judicial review permits
the culture to feel as if it is doing something honorable when it
engages in the practice of invidious discrimination.

A. RATIONALIZATION
Judicial review can rationalize the practice of illegitimate
discrimination by making the culture's oppressive behavior seem
as if it flows rationally from the equality principle embodied in
subprime lending collapse).
55. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781-86 (1983) (discussing
judicial confirmation ritual).
56. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957).
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the Constitution. This, in turn, provides an excuse for engaging
in
cultural
practices
that
would
otherwise
seem
unconstitutionally invidious. One of my friends has politely
characterized my skepticism about judicial review as "utterly
unpersuasive." That characterization may prove ultimately
correct, but to me it illustrates the strength of the hold that
judicial review has on the culture. Given that other liberal
democracies have historically favored parliamentary supremacy
over judicial review57 -and given the high degree of political
deference that characterizes most judicial review even in the
United States-one cannot help but wonder why judicial review
has such a strong hold on us. I believe it is because judicial
review helps us to camouflage our own hypocrisy.
Peter Westen has argued that the abstract idea of equality
lacks substantive content until it is paired with some normative
principle against which similarities and differences can be
assessed. However, once the normative assessment of similarities
and differences has been made, there is no additional work for
the equality principle to do. The equality principle simply
generates the tautological pronouncement of a conclusion that
was already determined by the normative analysis on which the
equality principle rests." Whether or not one ultimately agrees
with the Westen conclusion, his analysis-paired with the Realist
indeterminacy insights discussed in Part I.A-does seem to
illustrate that the concept of equality possesses sufficient
imprecision to make it easily manipulable. And that imprecision
also makes the concept available to facilitate constitutional
hypocrisy.
Judicial review has historically been very helpful in
depicting discriminatory behavior as if it complied with the
equality principle. Mike Seidman has argued that the Supreme
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education59 actually made it
easier to maintain racially segregated schools by denominating
single-race schools unitary, and that the decision in Miranda v.
Arizonad made it easier to coerce confessions from criminal
defendants by treating post-warning coerced confessions as if
they were equivalent to voluntary confessions.61 I have argued
57. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1 (discussing parliamentary supremacy in
Netherlands)
58. See Westen, supra note 17, at 542-48.
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting official school segregation).
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to give Mirandawarnings).
61. See Seidman, supra note 16.
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that, by exercising veiled majoritarian judicial review, the
Supreme Court has actually made it easier for the culture to
perpetuate the oppression of racial minorities.62 Indeed, most of
the examples offered in Part II.A above, to illustrate how
various substantive constitutional doctrines ultimately rest on
the concept of equality, can also be offered to illustrate how the
Supreme Court permits the culture to engage in discriminatory
behavior under the guise of equality.63
Although we claim to make the right to vote equally
available, the Supreme Court has permitted racial and political
minorities to be disproportionately disenfranchised 6 and wellfunded interest groups to have disproportionate influence over
elections.65 Despite the First Amendment claim that the

government must remain neutral in its regulation of speech or
access to the public forum, the Supreme Court has recognized

exceptions when the government acts as a speaker,66 educator,67
or proprietor,"8 and has recognized exceptions when the
government finds the speech to be particularly threatening. 9 The

Court has also allowed the government to deviate from religious
neutrality by "establishing" subsidies for mainstream religions"

and suppressing the "free exercise" of non-mainstream
religions. The Court's conception of "neutrality" with the right
to abortion ends up permitting the government to favor
childbirth over abortion, and to impose burdens on the right to

62. See generally SPANN, supra note 16.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-42.
64. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185-89, 200-04 (2008)
(upholding partisan Indiana voter ID law with alleged disparate impact on Democrats,
racial minorities, poor and elderly).
65. Citizens United v FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating federal
restrictions on corporate electioneering expenditures).
66. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009)
(upholding denial of religious display in public park as exercise of government speech).
67. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484, U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988)
(upholding regulation of school newspaper by school as educator).
68. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974)
(upholding advertising restriction on rapid transit vehicles by city acting in proprietary
capacity).
69. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (permitting
suppression of speech having intent and likely effect of producing imminent lawless
action).
70. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-63 (2002) (upholding
school voucher program that disproportionately benefitted religious schools).
71. See, e.g., Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 87476, 890 (1990) (upholding application of drug laws to prohibit religious use of peyote by
Native American Church); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1878)
(upholding prohibition on polygamy then practiced by Mormon church).
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abortion when favored by mobilized political majorities. 2 The
Court makes the right to end-of-life medical deference
discriminatorily available to those wish to end their suffering and
indignity by declining medical interventions, but not to those
who wish to do the same thing by receiving medical interventions."
So far, the substantive due process right to sexual privacy
recognized by the Supreme Court ends up protecting
heterosexual marriage but not same-sex marriage." Even the
right to travel that the Court has held prohibits discrimination in
the allocation of welfare benefits75 appears to permit
discrimination in the allocation of other benefits, such as

government jobs76 and tuition-free

public education.77 The

Court's state action jurisprudence seems to permit or prohibit
discrimination based on the Court's own approval or disapproval
of the underlying government action.8 And whether the
Supreme Court would today permit involuntary sterilizationsay, of a promiscuous mentally retarded woman who did not
understand the consequences of having sex-is likely to turn on
whether the Court approves of the underlying policy
determination made by the political body that has authorized
such sterilization.79
Because things are alike and different in myriad ways, the
Supreme Court has enormous latitude in deciding what does and
does not satisfy the equality principle. By manipulating
analytical baseline assumptions and shifting levels of generality,
the Court can decide when it wishes to protect or reject the
culture's forays into self-interested hypocrisy." The Court's
affirmative action cases provide perhaps the clearest example.
When the political culture was in favor of racial affirmative
action, the Supreme Court read the Constitution to permit and
sometimes require affirmative action, reasoning that the concept
72. See cases cited supra note 29; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007)
(upholding federal statutory ban on so-called partial-birth abortions).
73. See cases cited supra note 32.
74. See cases cited supra note 33.
75. See cases cited supra notes 35-36.
76. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645, 646-47
(1976) (upholding residency requirement for fire department employees)
77. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding residency

requirement for tuition-free public schools).
78.

See supra note 38-40.

79. See supra notes 41-42.
80. See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization,49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 709, 721-46
(2005) (discussing analytical techniques).
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of equality required prospective compensation for present
inequalities."' Now that the political culture has come to oppose
affirmative action, the Supreme Court has read the Constitution
to hold affirmative action largely unconstitutional. 82 Ironically,
the Court has even read Brown effectively to require the
resegregation of public schools.83
Some of my colleagues have suggested that Supreme Court
Justices are behaving in good faith when they endorse one of the
many possible meanings of equality that the realists have taught
us inevitably emanate from an indeterminate legal principle.
Accordingly, decisions that I might view as discriminatorily
oppressive do not necessarily generate dissonance on the part of
the Court-or the culture that it represents-because those
decisions are experienced as genuinely principled rather than as
hypocritical by those who issue and endorse them. However, I
do not believe that such decisions are made in good faith. The
nation's history of invidious discrimination based on race,
gender, religion and an unfortunately broad range of other traits,
is simply too long and too stark to escape notice when
perpetuated by contemporary Supreme Court decisions. I
believe that the Court-like the culture that it represents-is
affirmatively choosing to perpetuate such discrimination when it
issues such decisions, and that it must find some way to manage
the dissonance created by that self-knowledge. Barry Friedman
has demonstrated that the Supreme Court has typically reflected
the will of the people." In a very fundamental sense, the will of
the people has been to have their discriminatory inclinations
sanctified by the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court has
performed that function with religious conviction. 5
81. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (applying intermediate
scrutiny and upholding broadcast affirmative action); compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003) (upholding law school affirmative action) with Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (invalidating college affirmative action); cf. United States v
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153-66 (1987) (plurality opinion) (upholding court-ordered
affirmative action); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
482-83 (1986) (upholding court-ordered affirmative action).
82. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny and overruling Metro Broadcasting).
83. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 70911 (2007); id. at 745-48.
84. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE

CONSTITUTION (2009).
85. Cf. Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP.

CT. REv. 123, 130-32; 137-48 (using religion analogy to help explain Supreme Court
legitimation function).
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B. SANCTIFICATION
The nature of judicial review is such that, when the
Supreme Court pronounces the culture's discriminatory
practices to be consistent with the Constitution, it is sanctifying
both inequality and the cultural inferiority that inequality
connotes. The concept of sanctification conveys not only the idea
of imparting moral and social approval, but also an act of
purification that establishes freedom from sin. 6 Moreover, the
religious overtones of sanctification are appropriate because
realist insights have taught us that a considerable leap of faith is
required to believe that Supreme Court constitutional
adjudication could genuinely turn discrimination into equality,
and detach cultural discrimination from the invidiousness that it
often reflects.
Two now-infamous Supreme Court decisions serve to
illustrate the manner in which the Supreme Court can sanctify
the practice of cultural discrimination by certifying it as
consistent with the concept of equality. In Dred Scott v.
Sanford," the Court upheld the property rights of white
slaveholders against the liberty interests of black slaves, by
invalidating a congressional statute designed to limit the spread
of slavery. In so doing, Chief Justice Taney used particularly
demeaning language to constitutionalize the inferior status of
blacks, whom the Court held could not be recognized as citizens
within the meaning of the Constitution." In Bradwell v. Illinois,
the Court held that women could be denied the right to practice
law because of their gender.89 This time Justice Bradley's
concurring opinion used demeaning language to emphasize the
inferiority of women as individuals whose natural state made
them destined to be wives and mothers, unfit for the occupations

86. Sanctify Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
87. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be citizens within
the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity
jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery, as
interfering with property rights of slave owners), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
88. Id. at 404-05, 407, 451-52. I realize that Dred Scott is not the perfect example to
offer in support of this proposition, because the North ultimately responded to the
decision with a Civil War and then overruled the decision with the Fourteenth
Amendment. See FARBER, supra note 38, at 16-25. However, I suspect that the decision
did provide sanctification to the South by giving constitutional succor to views that had
prevailed throughout most of the nation during most of the era of slavery. The Dred Scott
Court simply misidentified the culture that it was supposed to be serving in 1857.
89. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872).
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of civil life.' Today, those holdings-and the language in which
they were expressed-seem anachronistically invidious. But that
is only because the political culture has evolved beyond the
forms of unapologetic oppression that prevailed at the time
those cases were decided.
The culture now engages in other forms of discrimination
that, in time, may come to be viewed as equally invidious. But
contemporary judicial review continues to sanctify contemporary
discrimination with demeaning language directed to the
opponents of such discrimination. For example, Chief Justice
Roberts has referred to race-conscious affirmative action
remedies for ast discrimination as "a sordid business" 91 that is
"pernicious," and "odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality,"93 as well as "patently
unconstitutional."9 4 The Court thus continues to dissipate
dissonance by assuring the culture that its present forms of
disparate treatment are not only consistent with the equality
principle, but are in fact noble. The culture's behavior is noble
because it demonstrates the courage to reject claims alleging
subtle forms of societal discrimination in favor of a
straightforward understanding of facial equality that does not
threaten to upset the status quo. Judicial review is particularly
good at dissonance reduction because it facilitates self-interested
self-deception.
My opposition to judicial review is subject to two rather
obvious objections. First, United States culture may be able to
withstand more hypocrisy-related dissonance than I imagine. For
example, one cannot fail to notice the vocal opposition that was
leveled against the proposed "ground zero mosque" in New
York City, and against proposed Muslim sites of worship in
other parts of the United States. I must admit that this
unabashed religious hostility to Islam does suggest a higher
degree of tolerance for the dissonance generated by raw cultural
hypocrisy than I would previously have predicted.95 However, I
retain the hope that such opposition is both transient, and more
of a marginal than a central component of contemporary United
90. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
91. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007).
93. Id. at 745-46.
94. Id. at 730, 732, 740.
95. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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States culture. Nevertheless, I suspect that vocal mosque
opposition would become even more widespread and durable if
the Supreme Court were now to sanctify that opposition by
ruling that the Constitution permits the forced relocation of
Muslim sites of worship.
The second obvious objection to my disenchantment with
judicial review relates to dissonance reduction. Even if I am
correct about the discomfort normally attendant to cognitive
dissonance, other dissonance reduction techniques may simply
fill any void that is left by the absence of judicial review. I
concede that there are always other dissonance reduction
techniques that the culture can invoke to deal with the fact that
it professes equality while practicing discrimination. In fact, one
of the primary skills possessed by successful politicians is the
ability to convince voters that their own parochial interests
coincide with fundamental overriding principles shared by
worthy segments of the culture at large. So, regressive tax cuts
are good because they stimulate economic growth; racial
profiling is permissible because it helps keep our borders secure;
gay marriage is bad because it undermines the fabric of
American family life; and the casualties of foreign military
interventions are defensible because they advance the war on
terror. However, everyone realizes that politicians engage in
partisan rhetoric, with equally strong partisan claims emanating
from the other side. This realization, therefore, dilutes the
effectiveness of mere politics as a dissonance-reduction
technique. But judicial review is different.
What makes judicial review a particularly offensive form of
dissonance reduction is that not everyone concedes that the
Supreme Court is just another political player. Most people insist
that the Court is doing something different- something loftier,
related to integrity, justice and fairness-when it interprets the
Constitution. Even those who realize that the Court is influenced
by politics are rarely willing to concede that the Court is simply
engaged in political activity that is qualitatively indistinguishable
from the actions of the representative branches. Judicial review
is offensive because it is both offered to, and received by, the
culture as a practice that is essentially good- rather than a
practice that is essentially duplicitous. Even if it were shown -as
perhaps it could be-that liberal democracies engage in precisely
the same amount of hypocrisy whether they practice judicial
review or not, I would still favor the elimination of judicial
review. Utilizing doctrine to effectuate a form of collective
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hypnosis, judicial review enables us to sidestep rather than
confront our discriminatory and oppressive inclinations. It
enables us to feel as if we are behaving in a principled manner,
even though we must know that we are not. And it enables us to
feel good about ourselves even though we do bad things to each
other. That is why judicial review is well-suited to protecting our
constitutional hypocrisy. And that is why judicial review is wellsuited to be dispensed with in my rewritten Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Legal realist insights -combined with the imprecision
inherent in the concept of equality that underlies most
constitutional provisions-make it difficult to claim that the
Supreme Court is doing anything other than exercising
policymaking discretion when it engages in the process of
constitutional adjudication. As a result, I believe that the Court
is better viewed as a political arm of a tricameral legislature than
as an institution that operates above ordinary politics.
Accordingly, judicial review is more likely to reflect the
prevailing normative biases and predispositions of the culture
than to constrain them. Therefore, it does not much matter what
official provisions the Constitution contains. The political
branches -including the Supreme Court-will simply read the
Constitution to correspond to the behavior in which the culture
wishes to engage. Nevertheless, I would rewrite the Constitution
to preclude judicial review.
United States culture relies on judicial review to ensure that
its practices conform to its constitutional principles. But judicial
review seems actually to legitimate discrepancies between
principle and practice by convincing the culture that its baser
discriminatory inclinations can be viewed as consistent with its
loftier commitment to abstract equality. In so doing, judicial
review serves to dissipate the cognitive dissonance that would
otherwise provide pressure for the culture genuinely to live up to
its constitutional principles. In short, judicial review facilitates
the constitutional hypocrisy that is often practiced by United
States culture, and it does so in a way that enables the culture to
feel self-righteously proud of its expedient pursuit of political
self-interest.
There is a paradox lurking beneath the surface of my
argument. I claim that constitutional provisions do not much
matter, because they will simply reflect rather than constrain the
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political behavior of the culture. At the same time I claim that
the Constitution should nevertheless be rewritten to preclude
judicial review, because judicial review facilitates constitutional
hypocrisy. Logically, I cannot have it both ways-either the
Constitution matters or it does not. In fact, I have been less
troubled by logical inconsistency since I learned that light can be
both a particle and a wave, but I understand that some people
still take logical contradictions pretty seriously. So I have a
proposal. If you will agree to think of the Supreme Court as
simply part of a tricameral legislative policymaking process, I
will agree to let the Court continue upholding or invalidating
representative branch actions in the exercise of its judicial
discretion. It will be as if a legislative proposal has simply
succeeded or failed to secure the approval of a legislative
chamber needed for its enactment. From the outside, this will
appear to be the exercise of traditional judicial review. But from
the inside, we will secretly realize that the Supreme Court's
function is simply to make us feel better about our often
unprincipled cultural behavior. That way, we can begin to
experience the dissonance that we should feel when we realize
that our practices do not always live up to our aspirational
norms, and we can then begin to make genuine efforts to try to
do better. That way we can rewrite the Constitution without
changing a single word. We can change its meaning simply by
changing the way that we think about what is going on when we
ask the Supreme Court to engage in the practice of judicial
review.

